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An evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game is studied with players located on a hierarchical structure
of layered square lattices. The players can follow two strategies [D (defector) and C (cooperator)] and their
income comes from PD games with the “neighbors.” The adoption of one of the neighboring strategies is
allowed with a probability dependent on the payoff difference. Monte Carlo simulations are performed to study
how the measure of cooperation is affected by the number of hierarchical levels (Q) and by the temptation to
defect. According to the simulations the highest frequency of cooperation can be observed at the top level if
the number of hierarchical levels is low (Q < 4). For larger Q, however, the highest frequency of cooperators
occurs in the middle layers. The four-level hierarchical structure provides the highest average (total) income for
the whole community.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) [1, 2, 3,
4, 5] is a very useful tool to examine the maintenance of coop-
erative behavior among selfish individuals. Investigating this
model, we can study the behavior of a fictive society: we can
collect data about the change of the total income when varying
the model parameters, e.g., payoffs, set of strategies, topolog-
ical structure of interaction, rules controlling the choice of a
new strategy, noise, and external constraints.
The original PDG is a version of matrix games describing
the interaction between two players. The payoffs of the play-
ers depend on their simultaneous decisions to cooperate or de-
fect. In this paper we use rescaled payoff parameters without
any loss of generality in the evolutionary PDGs [6]. Thus,
mutual cooperation yields the players unit income providing
them with the highest total payoff. On the contrary, their pay-
offs are zero for mutual defection. If one of the players defects
while the other cooperates then the defector receives the high-
est individual payoff (b > 1), i.e., there is a temptation to de-
fect, while the cooperator’s income (called sucker’s payoff) is
the lowest one (c < 0) . In the PDG the cooperator’s loss goes
beyond the profit of the defector, i.e., b+ c < 2. The values of
these payoffs create an unresolvable dilemma for intelligent
players who wish to maximize their own income; namely, de-
fection brings higher individual income independently of the
other player’s decision but for mutual defection they receive
the second worst result.
In the case of evolutionary multiagent systems [5, 7] we
face a totally changed situation. The players’ income is
gained from iterated PDGs played with different coplayers.
In the present study we handle only the two simplest strate-
gies which are independent of the coplayers’ decisions: the
first one is always cooperating, while the second one always
chooses defection. The players following these strategies are
called cooperators (C) and defectors (D) respectively. In evo-
lutionary games the players can adopt (learn) one of the more
successful strategies from the coplayers they interact with.
Generally, the probability of strategy adoption is determined
by the payoff difference.
The mean field approximation predicts that in a society of
players following the C or D strategy the cooperation dies
out after a short time. This happens in the case of the one-
dimensional chain if the interaction is limited to nearest neigh-
bors. At the boundary of a C and D cluster the defectors
always have higher payoff than the cooperators; thus cooper-
ation vanishes quickly.
To demonstrate the advance of local interactions in the
spatial games, Nowak and May [6] have created a two-
dimensional cellular automaton where the players could fol-
low the C or D strategy. Their investigations revealed that the
cooperators overrun the territory of defectors along straight-
line fronts while the defectors’ invasion can be seen along
irregular boundaries. It was shown that as a result of these
invasion processes the coexistence of D and C strategies took
place with a population ratio determined by the model pa-
rameters. Noisy effects make the boundaries irregular and
give more chance for defection [8, 9]. Randomly chosen
empty sites on the lattice further the maintenance of cooper-
ation [8, 10] by holding up the spreading of defectors. These
sites behave like defectors (for c = 0), but they cannot dis-
perse; they are “sterile.” Finally, it turned out that the short
range interactions between the localized players favor the
maintenance of cooperation under some conditions (e.g., for
small b values) even if just the simplest strategies (C orD) are
allowed [6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13]. If b, the temptation to defect, ex-
ceeds a threshold value depending on the evolutionary rules,
then the advantage of local interactions will not be enough to
preserve cooperation, so defection overcomes.
Recently spatial PDGs have been studied on different social
networks. First, different studies were performed to reveal
what happens on small-world networks [14]. It is found that
cooperation can be maintained on these networks in a wide
range of parameters [15, 16, 17, 18].
Nowadays the research is concentrated on the revelation of
those circumstances for which the total income of the soci-
2FIG. 1: Three-level “hierarchical lattice” constructed from square
lattices (perspective view). Within a level the players are linked to
their nearest neighbors, and to four other players located geometri-
cally under them at the level below. The horizontal periodic bound-
ary conditions are not indicated. White spheres indicate players at
the first and the third layers; meanwhile black spheres are for play-
ers at the second level. In our notation the highest hierarchical level
(q = 1) is at the top.
ety can reach its highest value. The other main purpose is to
find networks describing social systems more and more ade-
quately.
First we studied the PDG on such a scale-free hierarchical
structure suggested by Ravasz and Baraba´si [19] where the
distribution of the clustering coefficients is similar to that in
social systems. The results of this model are enclosed in the
Appendix.
As the cooperation is not maintained in this system, we
modified the model’s structure; we launched the study of a
hierarchical structure with many “horizontal links.” The equi-
librium strategy concentrations and average payoffs are ana-
lyzed as functions of b for each hierarchical level. By this
means we can get some information about those hierarchical
structures providing the highest total payoff for such a society.
II. THE MODEL
We consider an evolutionary PDG with players located on
the sites of a hierarchical structure (lattice). The three-level
version of this structure is shown in Fig. 1.
The Q-level hierarchical structure is constructed from the
sites of Q square lattices positioned above each other; mean-
while, the corresponding lattice constant is doubled level by
level. These levels are labeled by q = 1, . . . , Q from top to
bottom. Within a given level the sites are linked (horizon-
tally) to their four nearest neighbors. The undesired edge ef-
fects are eliminated by applying horizontal periodic boundary
conditions for each level. In addition, the sites of the level q
(q = 2, . . . , Q) are divided into 2× 2 blocks whose four sites
are linked to a common site above belonging to the level q−1.
This means that for such a connectivity structure each player
has four additional links to its “staff members” and another
one to its “chief.” Exceptions are naturally the players at the
top (q = 1) and bottom (q = Q) levels where the “chiefs” and
“staff members” are missing.
Consequently, the players at the top, middle, and bottom
levels have eight, nine, and five neighbors, and the corre-
sponding values of the clustering coefficient [20] are 1/7, 1/6,
and 1/5, respectively.
Note that this structure preserves the (horizontal) transla-
tional and rotational symmetry of the square lattice at the
top level. For technical convenience, the horizontal sizes of
the bottom layer are chosen to be L = 2k (k > Q) with
a unit lattice constant. In this case this structure contains
N = 4[4k − 4(k−Q)]/3 sites (players).
The players follow one of the above mentioned C or D
strategies. The spatial distribution of strategies is described
by a two-dimensional unit vector for each site x, namely,
sx =
(
1
0
)
or
(
0
1
)
(1)
for defectors and cooperators, respectively. Each player plays
a PDG with its “neighbors” (coplayers) defined by the above
structure and the incomes are summed. The total income of
the player at the site x can be expressed as
Mx =
∑
y∈Ωx
sTxAsy (2)
where the sum runs over all the neighboring sites of x (this set
is indicated by Ωx) and the payoff matrix has a rescaled form:
A =
(
0 b
c 1
)
, (3)
where 1 < b < 2 − c and c < 0 for the present PDGs. Since
the work by Nowak and May [6] the parameter c is usually
fixed to zero; therefore in our analysis we use the same value.
In the evolutionary games the players are allowed to adopt
the strategy of one of their more successful neighbors. In the
present work the success is measured by the ratio of total in-
dividual income and the number of neighbors (games), i.e.,
mx =
Mx
|Ωx|
, (4)
where |Ωx| indicates the number of neighboring players at site
x. This choice suppresses the advance coming from the larger
number of neighbors.
In the present evolutionary procedure the randomly chosen
player (x) can adopt one of the (randomly chosen) coplayer’s
(y) strategy with a probability depending on the difference of
normalized payoff (mx −my) as
W (sx ← sy) =
1
1 + exp [(mx −my)/T ]
, (5)
where T indicates the noise [7, 9]. This definition of W in-
volves different effects (fluctuations in payoffs, errors in deci-
sion, individual trials, etc.). Henceforth, we consider the ef-
fects of Q and b on the measure of cooperation for T = 0.02.
III. AVERAGE STRATEGY FREQUENCIES AND PAYOFFS
The Monte Carlo (MC) simulations are carried out by vary-
ing the values of b andQ for fixed c and T values as mentioned
above. For small system size, the MC simulations end up in
30
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1 1.02 1.04 1.06 1.08 1.1 1.12 1.14 1.16 1.18
fre
qu
en
cy
 o
f c
oo
pe
ra
to
rs
2/2 1/2
3/3
1/3 (top)
2/3
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1 1.05 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.25 1.3
fre
qu
en
cy
 o
f c
oo
pe
ra
to
rs
b
4/4
1/4
2/4
3/4
FIG. 2: Average frequency of cooperators as a function of b at differ-
ent q levels for Q = 2, 3 (top), and 4 (bottom). The dashed line (top)
indicates the results obtained on the square lattice (q = Q = 1).
one of the homogeneous absorbing states (homogeneousC or
D phase) within a short time. In order to avoid this undesired
phenomenon we have investigated sufficiently large systems
(containing N ≃ 105 − 106 players) where the amplitudes
of population fluctuations are considerably smaller than the
corresponding average values.
The MC simulations are started from a random initial dis-
tribution of strategies where the average frequency of both
strategies is 1/2. The above described evolutionary steps
(strategy adoptions) are repeated until the system reaches the
steady state we study. It is checked in some cases that the
steady states are independent of the initial conditions. The
steady states are reached after some transient time varied from
2000 to 50 000 Monte Carlo steps (MCS), where during the
time unit 1 MCS each player has a chance once on average to
modify its strategy.
In the course of the simulations we have recorded the cur-
rent frequencies [ρD(t) and ρC(t) = 1 − ρD(t)] and payoffs
[mD(t) and mC(t)] as a function of time t for both strategies
at each level. The corresponding average values are obtained
by averaging through 16 000 MCS. With knowledge of these
quantities, we can determine other quantities concerning the
whole system (total income of the society, strategy distribu-
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FIG. 3: The frequency of cooperators vs b on all the hierarchical
levels for Q = 5 (top) and 6 (bottom).
tions referring to the whole system, etc.).
First we study how the strategy populations at each level
depend on Q and b. The results for Q = 2, 3, and 4 are plot-
ted in Fig. 2, and Fig. 3 represents the data for Q = 5 and 6.
The corresponding system sizes are N = 81 920, 344 064,
348 160, 349 184, and 349 440. For these sizes the statistical
error is comparable with the line thickness. It is observed that
there always exists a threshold value (bc) for any value of Q.
For b > bc the cooperators become extinct. This critical value,
however, depends on the number of hierarchical levels: bc(Q).
The exact value of bc for eachQ is not determined because the
thermalization time (as well as the fluctuation) grows very fast
when approaching the critical points. Consequently, the pre-
cise determination of bc requires a very long computer time
(this is the reason why the end points are not represented in
the figures). It is expected that the extinction of cooperators
at large spatial scales belong to the two-dimensional directed
percolation universality class [9, 21]. Unfortunately, the nu-
merical justification of this conjecture exceeds our computer
capacity.
We have performed MC simulations on the square lattice
with periodic boundary conditions (Q = 1), too. The fre-
quency of cooperators vanishes continuously as a function of
b (dashed line in the upper plot of Fig. 2). The value of the
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FIG. 4: The frequency of cooperators in the whole system as a func-
tion of b and Q.
critical point is bc = 1.028 524(5). The phase transition be-
longs to the two-dimensional directed percolation universality
class [9, 21].
Comparing the results of the two-level case with those on
the square lattice one can see an increase of bc that may
have come from the enhancement in the average number of
neighbors (from 4 to 5.6) and/or the average clustering coef-
ficient (from 0 to 0.189). It is worth mentioning that both of
these quantities increase monotonically with Q. In the limit
Q → ∞ the average number of neighbors goes to six and the
average clustering coefficient tends to 23/120 = 0.1916˙.
Figures 2 and 3 show clearly that the frequencies of co-
operators differ level by level. At the same time, the phase
transitions to the absorbing (homogeneous) D state occur for
each level at the same critical value of b dependent onQ. This
feature is related to the fact that the successful colonies of
cooperators can pass their strategy to any level although its
probability depends on q.
Another striking message of the above numerical results is
that the lowest measure of cooperation always occurs at the
bottom level. The label of the most cooperative level, how-
ever, depends on Q and b. For Q = 2, 3, and 4 the frequency
of cooperators is the highest at the top level, and it is decreas-
ing monotonically when going downward on these hierarchi-
cal structures. The simulations for the given parameters show
different behaviors ifQ > 4. In the five-level system the high-
est measure of cooperation is reached by players in the second
level in a wide range of b and their frequency is exceeded by
the cooperators of the top level only in the vicinity of the crit-
ical point. The interval where the measure of cooperation is
the highest at the top level becomes narrower for Q = 6. In
this case one can observe two additional regions of b where
the second and third levels exhibit the highest cooperativity.
Furthermore, within a wide range of b the measure of cooper-
ation at the fourth level is higher than it is at the top level.
Summarizing the data of the different levels, we can de-
termine the measure of cooperation in the whole system as a
function of Q and b. The average values are very low. The
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FIG. 5: The average (normalized) payoffs as a function of b at each
hierarchical level for Q = 4. The top (middle) plot shows the aver-
age payoffs of cooperators (defectors) while the bottom figure indi-
cates the weighted average payoffs at each level.
reason for this is that the measure of cooperation is the lowest
at the bottom level where most of the players are located. As
plotted in Fig. 4 the measure of cooperation has its maximum
for Q = 4 for almost any value of b. It is observable that the
bc(Q) values increase monotonically withQ, and they seem to
converge to a value near bc(Q = 6). This tendency is likely to
come from the mentioned convergence of the average number
of neighbors and/or the average clustering coefficient.
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FIG. 6: The average (normalized) payoffs vs b at each hierarchical
level for Q = 6.
Now we are going to analyze the average payoffs separately
at the different levels as well as in the whole system. Figures 5
and 6 show the average payoffs of cooperators and defectors at
each level for several Q values. Beyond that, the players’ av-
erage payoff at each level is also presented. Comparing these
figures with those representing the frequency of cooperators
for the same Q, one can observe high similarity. This similar-
ity is due to the fact that the cooperative partners ensure (pos-
itive) income for both the cooperators and defectors. (The
total payoff for a player following the C or D strategy and
having n neighbors following the C strategy is equal to n or
bn, respectively.) Notice, furthermore, that the dominant part
of the total income is received by the cooperators whose aver-
age incomes exceed those of defectors at each level. This fact
comes from the formation of colonies by cooperators explain-
ing why their average income remains positive for their van-
ishing concentrations. Although along the boundary of these
colonies the defectors exploit cooperators, their average in-
come is lower because most of them are surrounded by defec-
tors and receive zero income. Evidently, the average payoff in
the whole system (as well as the defectors’ payoffs for each
level) disappears continuously when approaching the critical
point (b→ bc) from below.
In the six-level system, the rank of the average defector
payoff differs from that of the cooperator payoff. The aver-
age income of defectors is the highest at the second and the
first levels. The reason for this is that for Q = 6, the high-
est measure of cooperation is found at the middle levels and
as the result of the geometrical arrangement of the structure,
these cooperators can be exploited the most by the defectors
located geometrically above them.
For Q = 2 and 3 the average payoffs exhibit similar fea-
tures as are found for Q = 4 (see Fig. 5) while for Q = 5
the system behavior is analogous to the case of the six-level
system.
For the different Q values the b dependence of the total
payoff per game (in the whole system) is very similar to the
measure of cooperation plotted in Fig. 4. This means that the
four-level hierarchy provides the highest average income to
the players for such connectivity structures.
IV. SUMMARY
This work is devoted to studying the effect of the hierarchi-
cal structure on the measure of cooperation in a society where
the pairwise interaction between the members is modeled by
an evolutionary PDG with two strategies (C and D).
Using MC simulations we have determined the frequency
of cooperators as a function of b (the measure of temptation to
choose defection) at the different hierarchical levels in the Q-
level structures. These systems exhibit a continuous (critical)
transition from the C + D state to the homogeneous D state
if b tends to bc depending on Q. During this transition the
cooperators become extinct simultaneously at each level of
the hierarchical structures.
The lowest measure of cooperation is always found at the
bottom level. In the close vicinity of the transition point the
frequency of cooperators is increasing gradually when going
upward on the hierarchical structures. For lower b values,
however, significantly different behavior is observed ifQ > 4;
namely, the highest frequency of cooperators is found in the
middle levels; meanwhile the total payoff per game decreases
if Q is increased for a fixed b. Surprisingly, the present sim-
ulations indicate clearly the existence of an optimum number
of hierarchical levels where such a community can reach the
highest income. For the present hierarchical lattices the four-
level structure provides the highest income (productivity).
6Another important message of the present investigations is
related to the importance of “horizontal lattice structure” (or
the additional horizontal links) in the hierarchical structures.
As is mentioned in the Introduction, the cooperators die out
exponentially in a similar evolutionary PDG model if the play-
ers are located on a complex hierarchical network suggested
by Ravasz and Baraba´si [19]. We think that further system-
atic research is required to clarify the relationship between
the maintenance of cooperation and the topological structure
of connectivity.
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APPENDIX: EVOLUTIONARY PRISONER’S DILEMMA
GAME ON A SCALE-FREE HIERARCHICAL NETWORK
In this model, the players are located on a scale-free net-
work, where the distribution of the clustering coefficients is
similar to that in social systems. The dynamical rule in this
model is the same as described in Sec. II; the difference oc-
curs in the structure of the network.
The construction of the network suggested by Ravasz and
Baraba´si [19] is the following. In the first step, there is a
small cluster of five densely linked nodes [Fig. 7(a)]. In the
next step, we generate four replicas of this cluster and connect
the four external nodes of the replicated clusters to the cen-
tral node of the old cluster, creating a large 25-node module
[Fig. 7(b)]. Continuing the process, we again generate four
replicas of this 25-node cluster, and connect the 16 periph-
eral nodes of each replica to the central node of the old mod-
ule [Fig. 7(c)], obtaining a new module of 125 nodes. These
replication and connection steps can be iterated indefinitely;
in each step the number of nodes is multiplied by a factor of
5.
The generated graph has a power-law degree distribution
with a degree exponent γ = 1 + ln 5/ ln 4 = 2.161. In this
network for N ≥ 125 the average clustering coefficient is
C ≃ 0.743. The network’s hierarchical structure is appar-
ent: there are several, small, fully connected five-node graphs,
which are clustered into larger 25-node graphs. The 25-node
graphs are clearly separated from each other, and they are
clustered into much larger 125-node graphs, etc.
The hierarchical levels are introduced in the following way.
Being in the center of bigger cluster means being at higher
level in the hierarchy. Figure 7(b) shows a three-level hierar-
chy: there is only one player at the first (highest) hierarchical
level, the one in the center of the entire structure; the cen-
ter nodes of the four “replicas” are at the second level, while
the other nodes are at the third (lowest) level (there are 20
nodes of this type). One iterative step increases the number
of hierarchical levels by 1. The analyzed network has H = 7
hierarchical levels; therefore the number of players (nodes) is
N = 5H−1 = 56 = 15 625.
(a) n=0, N=5
(b) n=1, N=25
(c) n=2, N=125
FIG. 7: Iterative steps (indicated by n) in the construction of the
scale-free network.
We have performed Monte Carlo simulations as described
previously by varying b for fixed temperature (T = 0.01, 0.02,
and 0.05), to analyze what happens in a society where the
players can follow C or D strategies.
Two different stages can be distinguished as the system
evolves. The first one is a transient process, where most of the
small groups of cooperators die out. After this period (≃ 4000
MCS), the cooperators remain on such groups of sites where
they can defend themselves against the defectors’ “attacks.”
In this state the frequency of cooperators rather depends on
the initial distribution of strategies than the value of b.
The small groups of cooperators can survive in two types
of configurations. In the first case, they occupy a five-node
subgraph [see the graph in Fig. 7(a)] with central node at the
levelH−1. The other basic unit of the C groups is composed
of the four peripheral nodes of a five-node graph with a central
node located at a hierarchical level h ≥ H − 1.
Within such cliques [20], if all the players cooperate, then
(due to the many internal links) they receive such a high in-
come from each other that it provides protection against the
external D invaders even for the highest b value. For this par-
ticular structure the normalized payoff of the attacking defec-
tors is reduced drastically by the many neighboring D strate-
gies. Occasionally, however, these groups can be invaded by
defectors in the presence of noise. If a single D strategy gets
into a clique then its offspring invade the whole group within
a short time because these internal defectors (who have only a
few defector neighbors) exploit all the internal cooperators.
The above process implies a decrease in the number of co-
operators’ cliques as well as in the average frequency of co-
operators. Figure 8 shows a noisy steplike decrease of C fre-
quency in time where the magnitude of the steplike decrease
corresponds to the disappearance of a cooperator clique de-
scribed above. As the players in the small cooperator groups
have higher average payoffs than the defectors, they invade
continuously the territory of the defectors. At the same time,
due to the network’s topology, the mutual cooperation cannot
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FIG. 8: The frequency of cooperators as a function of time at the two
lowest hierarchical levels.
persist within these territories; therefore the D strategy will
recapture them in a short time.
As a result of the above process the system will end up in
the absorbing D state for any b. The average lifetime of the
rare cooperator cliques depends on b and T . More precisely,
the extinction of the cooperators becomes slower for lower b
and T . The probability of the first successful D attack against
a C clique can be estimated by the application of Eq. 5, and
the corresponding theoretical predictions are consistent with
the results of the simulations.
[1] J. Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1982).
[2] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Games and Popula-
tion Dynamics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.,
1998).
[3] J. W. Weibull, Evolutionary Game Theory (MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 1995).
[4] W. D. Hamilton, Am. Nat. 97, 354 (1963).
[5] R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, New
York, 1984).
[6] M. A. Nowak and R. M. May, Int. J. Bifurcation Chaos Appl.
Sci. Eng. 3, 35 (1993).
[7] L. E. Blume, Games Econ. Behav. 5, 387 (1993).
[8] M. A. Nowak, S. Bonhoeffer, and R. M. May, Int. J. Bifurcation
Chaos Appl. Sci. Eng. 4, 33 (1994).
[9] G. Szabo´ and C. To˝ke, Phys. Rev. E 58, 69 (1998).
[10] M. H. Vainstein and J. J. Arenzon, Phys. Rev. E 64, 051905
(2001).
[11] F. Schweitzer, L. Behera, and H. Mu¨hlenbein, Adv. Complex
Syst. 5, 269 (2002).
[12] M. Nakamaru, H. Matsuda, and Y. Iwasa, J. Theor. Biol. 184,
65 (1997).
[13] C. Hauert, S. De Monte, J. Hofbauer, and K. Sigmund, J. Theor.
Biol 218, 187 (2002).
[14] D. J. Watts and S. H. Strogatz, Nature (London) 393, 440
(1998).
[15] G. Abramson and M. Kuperman, Phys. Rev. E 63, 030901
(2001).
[16] B. J. Kim, A. Trusina, P. Holme, P. Minnhagen, J. S. Chung,
and M. Y. Choi, Phys. Rev. E 66, 021907 (2002).
[17] H. Ebel and S. Bornholdt, Phys. Rev. E 66, 056118 (2002).
[18] G. Szabo´ and J. Vukov, Phys. Rev. E 69, 036107 (2004).
[19] E. Ravasz and A.-L. Baraba´si, Phys. Rev. E 67, 026112 (2003).
[20] B. Bolloba´s, Modern Graph Theory (Springer, New York,
1998).
[21] H. Hinrichsen, Adv. Phys. 49, 815 (2000).
